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Abstract
We model technological and ￿nancial innovation as re￿ ecting the decisions of pro￿t
maximizing agents and explore the implications for economic growth. We start with a
Schumpeterian growth model where entrepreneurs earn pro￿ts by inventing better goods
and ￿nanciers arise to screen entrepreneurs. A novel feature of the model is that ￿nanciers
also engage in the costly, risky, and potentially pro￿table process of innovation: Financiers
can invent more e⁄ective processes for screening entrepreneurs. Every screening process,
however, becomes less e⁄ective as technology advances. Consequently, technological inno-
vation and economic growth stop unless ￿nanciers continually innovate. The model also
allows for rent-seeking ￿nancial innovation, in which ￿nanciers engage in privately pro￿table
but socially ine¢ cient innovation that slows growth. Empirical evidence is more consistent
with this dynamic, synergistic model of ￿nancial and technological innovation than with
existing theories.
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Financial innovation has been an integral component of economic activity for several millennia.
About six thousand years ago, the Sumerian city of Uruk blossomed as tradable debt contracts
emerged to facilitate a diverse assortment of intertemporal transactions underlying increased
specialization, innovation, and economic development (Goetzmann, 2009). In ancient Rome,
private investors steadily developed all of the features of limited liability companies, including
freely traded shares, an active stock exchange, and corporations that owned property and wrote
contracts independently of the individual shareholders. The creation of these corporations eased
the mobilization of capital for innovative, large-scale mining technologies (Malmendier, 2009).
To ￿nance the construction of vast railroad systems in the 19th and 20th centuries, ￿nancial
entrepreneurs developed highly specialized investment banks, new ￿nancial instruments, and
improved accounting systems to foster screening by distant investors (Baskin and Miranti,
1997; and Neal, 1990). Over the last couple of centuries, ￿nanciers continuously modi￿ed
and enhanced securities to mitigate agency concerns and informational asymmetries impeding
the ￿nancing of frontier technologies (Graham and Dodd, 1934; Allen and Gale, 1994; and
Tufano, 2003). More recently, ￿nancial entrepreneurs created venture capital ￿rms to screen
high-tech inventions and then modi￿ed these arrangements to support biotechnology endeavors
(Schweitzer, 2006).
Yet, models of economic growth generally ignore ￿nancial innovation and instead take the
￿nancial system as given and inert. Most frequently, ￿nancial arrangements are added to the
core models of endogenous technological change developed by Romer (1986, 1990) and Aghion
and Howitt (1991). For example, in King and Levine (1993) and Galetovic (1996), the ￿nancial
system a⁄ects the rate of technological change by determining the frequency with which society
allocates funds to those entrepreneurs with the highest probability of successfully innovating.
In Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes (2005), henceforth denoted as AHM, di⁄erences in
￿nancial development determine the resources available to entrepreneurs for innovation. In
Bencivenga and Smith (1991), Levine (1991), and Obstfeld (1994), ￿nance in￿ uences long-run
growth by a⁄ecting the risk of investing in high-return projects. In these models, however,
￿nancial contracts, markets, and intermediaries neither emerge nor evolve endogenously with
technological change.
Even in models where the size of the ￿nancial system changes as the economy develops,
the same pro￿t motives that underlie technological innovation do not spur ￿nancial innovation.
In Greenwood and Jovanovic￿ s (1990) in￿ uential paper, ￿nancial intermediaries produce infor-
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cost to joining ￿nancial intermediaries, growth means that more individuals can a⁄ord to join
and bene￿t from ￿nancial intermediation, which enhances the e¢ ciency of capital allocation
and accelerates economic growth. Thus, economic growth and membership in the ￿nancial
intermediary evolve together. In Greenwood, Sanchez, and Wang (2010), ￿nancial intermedi-
aries invest resources to monitor ￿rms. When ￿nancial institutions invest more resources, this
enhances capital allocation and accelerates growth. Yet, in these models, improvements in the
e⁄ectiveness of the monitoring technology are not determined by agents choosing to invest in
the risky process of ￿nancial innovation. In this sense, therefore, ￿nancial innovation remains
exogenously given.
In this paper, we model both technological and ￿nancial innovation as re￿ ecting the
explicitly, pro￿t maximizing choices of individuals and explore the implications for economic
growth. We start with a textbook model of Schumpeterian growth, where entrepreneurs seek to
extract monopoly pro￿ts by engaging in the costly and risky process of inventing new goods and
production methods (Aghion and Howitt, 2009). Financiers arise to screen potential innovators
and identify the most promising ones.
A novel and de￿ning feature of our model is that ￿nancial entrepreneurs also innovate to
extract monopoly pro￿ts. Financiers can engage in a costly and risky innovative activity that,
if successful, allows them to screen entrepreneurs better than competing ￿nanciers. Successful
￿nancial innovation, therefore, generates monopoly rents for the ￿nancier, just as successful
technological innovation generates monopoly rents for the technological entrepreneur. Since
individuals are willing to pay for information about entrepreneurs, ￿nanciers arise to provide
this information as in Boyd and Prescott (1986). Moreover, we endogenize the actions of
￿nanciers. Financiers maximize pro￿ts by seeking to create better screening technologies than
their competitors, spurring ￿nancial innovation and fostering the e¢ cient allocation of capital
to technological entrepreneurs striving to innovate.
A second noteworthy feature of the model is that every existing screening methodology
becomes less e⁄ective at identifying promising entrepreneurs as technology advances. For ex-
ample, the processes for screening the builders of new, cross-Atlantic ships in the 16th century
were less e⁄ective at screening innovations in railroad technologies in the 19th century. The
methods for screening pharmaceuticals in the 1960s are less appropriate for evaluating biotech-
nology ￿rms today. At the same time, technological innovation increases the potential pro￿ts
from ￿nancial innovation. Thus, technological innovation makes existing screening technologies
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potential pro￿ts from enhanced screening drove ￿nanciers to develop specialized investment
banks, new contracts, and more elaborate reporting standards to screen railroads and to cre-
ate venture capital ￿rms to better evaluate and monitor new high-tech ￿rms. Financial and
technological innovations are inextricably linked.
Two central, interrelated implications of the theory are that (1) technological change
and ￿nancial innovation will be positively correlated and (2) economic growth will eventually
stagnate unless ￿nanciers innovate. Technological change increases the returns to ￿nancial
innovation, and improvements in the screening methodology boost the expected pro￿ts from
technological innovations. At the extreme, in the absence of ￿nancial innovation, existing
screening methods will become increasingly obsolete as technological innovation continues, so
that the probability of identifying successful entrepreneurs falls toward zero, eliminating growth.
Pro￿t seeking ￿nanciers, however, can avoid economic stagnation by creating new, more e⁄ec-
tive screening technologies. The drive for pro￿ts by ￿nancial and technological entrepreneurs
alike, therefore, can produce a continuing stream of ￿nancial and technological innovations that
sustain long-run growth.
Although the main contribution of this paper is the development of a theoretical model
in which the pro￿t maximizing decisions of technological and ￿nancial entrepreneurs drive
economic growth, we also examine the model￿ s predictions empirically. Our theory yields an
estimation equation that di⁄ers in one key dimension from AHM: our theory predicts that
￿nancial innovation a⁄ects the speed with which economies converge to the economic leader￿ s
growth path, while their model focuses on the impact of the level of ￿nancial development
on economic growth. Based on cross-country evidence, AHM ￿nd that the level of ￿nancial
development expedites convergence to the economic leader￿ s long-run growth path. Thus, to
evaluate the predictions of our model, we extend the AHM regression framework to also include
measures of ￿nancial innovation.
We primarily measure ￿nancial innovation in a country by how quickly the country adopts
a particular innovation associated with screening entrepreneurs. Speci￿cally, we measure the
year in which private agents in an economy create a private credit bureau to share information
about potential borrowers based on the data in Djankov et al. (2007). This empirical proxy
is directly linked with the notion of ￿nancial innovation in our theoretical model, in which
￿nanciers invest in adapting and adopting better screening technologies. Pagano and Jappelli
(1993) show that credit bureaus improve screening and credit allocation. In the regressions, we
3use the percentage of years between 1960 and 1995 in which a country has a private credit bureau
to measure ￿nancial innovation, i.e., the speed with which countries adopt frontier screening
technologies. To further evaluate the theoretical model, we examine the emergence of public
credit registries that organize the sharing of information on potential borrowers. According to
the model, it is private, pro￿t maximizing ￿nancial innovators that invest in screening, so we
assess whether public registries provide similar, growth-enhancing services. And, in robustness
tests, we use several alternative measures of ￿nancial innovation.
Consistent with the empirical prediction of our model, we ￿nd that ￿nancial innovation
boosts the speed with which economies converge to the growth path of the economic leader, but
the level of ￿nancial development does not. Furthermore, we that the more rapid creation of
private credit bureaus boosts the rate of economic convergence, but the more rapid formation
of public credit registries does not. The results are robust to using instrumental variables to
control for possible endogeneity and measurement error, and to controlling for many country
characteristics. Consistent with theory, the results indicate that ￿nancial innovation boosts
growth by enhancing the e¢ ciency of resource allocation, not simply by boosting capital ac-
cumulation. Overall, the regression results con￿rm the theory￿ s prediction: economies without
￿nancial innovation stagnate, irrespective of the initial level of ￿nancial development.
From a policy perspective, the paper stresses adaptability and innovation as key elements
for sustaining economic growth. Growth eventually stops in the absence of ￿nancial innovation.
Legal, regulatory, or policy impediments to ￿nancial innovation stymie technological change
and economic growth in the long-run. Rather than stressing policies that support a particular
level of ￿nancial development, the theory highlights the value of policies that facilitate e¢ cient
improvements in screening technologies (Merton, 1995).
Furthermore, our paper contributes to debates on the costs and bene￿ts of ￿nancial
innovation provoked by the recent ￿nancial crisis. Many argue that recent ￿nancial innovations
facilitated the extraction of short-run pro￿ts for ￿nanciers, not improvements in screening
methodologies that enhance social welfare. For example, Dell￿ Ariccia, Igan, and Laeven (2008),
Mian and Su￿(2009), and Keys et al. (2010) show that securitization, one of the key ￿nancial
innovations in recent years, reduced lending standards and increased loan delinquency rates,
while simultaneously boosting the supply of loans and ￿nancier pro￿ts (Loutskina and Strahan,
2009). Financial innovation can be harmful or ine¢ cient (Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2011;
Thakor, 2011). We do not conduct a comprehensive assessment of the pros and cons of ￿nancial
innovation and ￿nancial regulation. Rather, we develop a new theoretical framework in which
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empirical evidence consistent with the model￿ s predictions.
Our model also examines rent-seeking ￿nancial innovations. These are innovations that
are privately pro￿table for ￿nanciers but socially unproductive. In the model, rent-seeking
￿nancial innovation slows growth. In the empirical analyses, however, we do not have a measure
of rent seeking; we simply have a measure of ￿nancial innovation that fostered information
sharing. In the future, this framework can be extended to include policy and other distortions
that create incentives for ￿nancial innovations that increase ￿nancier pro￿ts at the expense of
social welfare. From this perspective, our paper represents an initial step toward building a more
general, dynamic theory of endogenous growth, ￿nancial innovation, and ￿nancial regulation.
One limitation of our analysis is that we de￿ne ￿nance narrowly. We examine only the
role of the ￿nancial system in screening innovative activities. We do not model risk diversi￿-
cation, pooling, and trading. We do not examine the role of the ￿nancial system in reducing
transaction costs, enhancing the governance of ￿rms, or in mitigating the moral hazard and
adverse selection problems arising from informational asymmetries. Rather, we focus on one
critical and core function of a ￿nancial system￿ acquiring and processing information about
investments before they are funded.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides historical examples
of the importance of ￿nancial innovation. Section 3 outlines the basic structure of the model,
and Section 4 solves the model, determines the factors underlying steady state growth, and
derives testable implications. Section 5 takes the model to the data, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Historical Examples and Motivation
In this short subsection, we provide a few historical examples to illustrate the synergistic ties
between ￿nancial and technical innovation and motivate key features of the formal model that
we develop below. In particular, these examples suggest that (1) ￿nancial innovations that
improve the screening of entrepreneurs boost the rate of technological innovation and hence
economic growth; (2) technological innovation, in turn, creates opportunities for ￿nanciers to
earn pro￿ts by further enhancing their screening capabilities to assess the next wave of tech-
nological advances; and (3) e⁄ective screening by ￿nanciers not only helps investors identify
entrepreneurs with the most promising ideas, screening also provides information to entre-
preneurs about the potential pro￿tability of their ideas. Put di⁄erently, e⁄ective screening
provides information to investors and entrepreneurs. The examples highlight the endogenous,
5coevolution of ￿nancial and technological innovation.
Consider ￿rst the ￿nancial impediments to railroad expansion in the 19th century. The
￿nancial innovations that fostered improvements in ship design and oceanic explorations in the
16th - 18th centuries were ine⁄ective at screening and funding innovations in steam-powered
railroads in the 19th century (Baskin and Miranti, 1997). While holding out the promise of
extraordinary pro￿ts, railroads were a new, complex technology. Severe informational asymme-
tries made it di¢ cult for investors to screen and monitor railroads, which impeded investment.
Given these informational problems, prominent local investors with close ties to those operat-
ing the railroad were the primary sources of capital for railroads during the initial decades of
this new technology (Chandler, 1954, 1965, 1977). This reliance on local ￿nance, however, re-
stricted the growth and pro￿tability of railroads and, therefore, limited investment in improving
railroad technology.
So, ￿nanciers innovated. Since problems with screening railroads impeded pro￿table in-
vestments, pro￿t-seeking ￿nanciers arose to mitigate these problems (Baskin and Miranti, 1997,
p. 137-138). Specialized ￿nanciers and investment banks emerged to mobilize capital from in-
dividuals, screen and invest in railroads, and monitor the use of those investments, often by
serving on the boards of directors of railroad corporations (Carosso, 1970). For example, after
successfully ￿nancing the highly pro￿table line from Manchester to Liverpool, the same British
investors played leading roles in screening, funding, and monitoring rail lines in other parts of
England (Baskin and Miranti, 1997, p. 137). In the United States, several major investment
banking houses, such as J.P. Morgan & Company and Kuhn-Loeb & Company, became ex-
perts at evaluating railroads. Based on their expertise and reputation, they mobilized funds
from wealthy investors, evaluated proposals from railroads, allocated capital, and oversaw the
operations of railroad companies for investors. As explained by Chernow (1990), these bankers
not only helped investors fund promising railroads, they also provided useful information to
railroad entrepreneurs. Besides facilitating an increase in track mileage, ￿nancial innovation
fostered investment in creating faster, more comfortable, and safer trains (Chandler, 1977).
Financiers also improved accounting and ￿nancial reporting methods, which both helped
the railroad ￿rms and facilitated the screening and monitoring of railroads by investors. As
documented by Chandler (1965, 1977), the geographical size and complexity of railroads forced
￿nanciers to pioneer new procedures for collecting, organizing, and assessing price, usage,
breakdown, and repair information. While these accounting and reporting innovations boosted
the operational e¢ ciency of the railroads, these ￿nancial tools also made it easier for outside
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Miranti, 1997, p. 143-145).1
But, the ￿nancial innovations that fostered the success of railroads were incapable of fu-
eling the innovations in information processing, telecommunications, and biotechnology during
the last 30 years. Indeed, as nascent high-tech information and communication ￿rms struggled
to emerge in the 1970s and 1980s, traditional commercial banks were reluctant to ￿nance them
because these new ￿rms did not yet generate su¢ cient cash ￿ ows to cover loan payments and
the ￿rms were run by scientists with no experience in operating pro￿table companies (Gompers
and Lerner, 2001). Conventional debt and equity markets were also wary because the technolo-
gies were too complex for investors to evaluate. There was a problem: Potentially pro￿table
high-tech ￿rms could not raise su¢ cient capital because the existing ￿nancial system could not
screen them e⁄ectively.
So, ￿nanciers innovated. Venture capital ￿rms arose to screen entrepreneurs and provide
technical, managerial, and ￿nancial advice to new high-technology ￿rms. In many cases, ven-
ture capitalists had become wealthy through their own successful high-tech innovations, which
provided a basis of expertise for evaluating new entrepreneurs. In fact, venture capitalists often
had more information about the potential pro￿tability of an embryonic technology than the ini-
tiating innovators themselves. Thus, venture capitalists provided guidance to innovators, while
also attracting additional capital from outside investors. In terms of funding, venture capitalists
typically took large, private equity stakes that established a long-term commitment to the en-
terprise, and they generally became active investors, taking seats on the board of directors and
helping to solve managerial and ￿nancial problems. Motivated by pro￿ts, ￿nanciers innovated
by creating venture capitalist institutions to better screen and ￿nance high-tech ￿rms.
But, the venture capital modality did not work well for biotechnology. Venture capitalists
could not e⁄ectively screen biotech ￿rms because of the scienti￿c breadth of biotechnologies,
which frequently require inputs from biologists, chemists, geneticists, engineers, bioroboticists,
as well as experts on the myriad of laws, regulations, and commercial barriers associated with
1Besides reducing informational asymmetries, ￿nancial innovations helped railroads in other ways. New
￿nancial instruments, and the expanded use of existing securities, eased ￿nancial constraints on railroads, reduced
the risk of bankruptcy from short-term reductions in income, and customized the risks facing potential investors
in railroads, all of which combined to increase investment in railroads (Baskin and Miranti, 1997, p. 146-157;
Tufano, 1997, p. 20-28). By providing a menu of securities with di⁄erent characteristics, railroads greatly
expanded the range of outside investors favorably disposed to purchase railroad securities. In this paper, we
focus only on ￿nancial innovations that reduce informational asymmetries. Clearly, other forms of ￿nancial
innovation also shape investment in technological change as suggested by Goetzmann and Rouwenhorst￿ s (2005)
masterful discussion of ￿nancial innovations throughout history.
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expertise in banks or venture capital ￿rms. Again, a new technology￿ biotechnology￿ o⁄ered
the possibility of enormous pro￿ts, di¢ culties with screening biotech entrepreneurs and ideas
hindered investment in this technology.
So, to earn pro￿ts, ￿nanciers innovated. They formed new ￿nancial partnerships with
the one kind of organization with the breadth of skills to screen bio-tech ￿rms: large pharma-
ceutical companies. Pharmaceutical companies employ, or are in regular contact with, a large
assortment of scientists and engineers, have close connections with those delivering medical
products to customers, and employ lawyers well versed in drug regulations. Thus, pharmaceu-
tical companies can help identify which bio-tech ideas have the highest probability of yielding
pro￿table products; pharmaceutical companies help bio-tech entrepreneurs determine whether
they have a truly promising innovation. Furthermore, given their expertise, investment by a
pharmaceutical in a bio-tech ￿rm tends to encourage others to invest in the ￿rm as well. While
￿nancial innovation is not the only cause of technological change, the adaptation of ￿nance
to technological innovation greased the wheels of technological inventiveness underlying eco-
nomic growth. Put di⁄erently, without ￿nancial innovation, improvements in diagnostic and
surgical procedures, prosthetic devices, parasite-resistant crops, and other innovations linked
to bio-technology would be occurring at a far slower pace.
These examples highlight the synergistic relationship between ￿nance and technology. As
described by Adam Smith, the very essence of economic growth involves increased specialization
and the use of more sophisticated technologies. Thus, economic growth, technological change,
and greater complexity are inextricably linked. The increased complexity, however, makes it
more di¢ cult for the existing ￿nancial system to screen the ideas of budding entrepreneurs.
Economic progress itself, therefore, makes the existing ￿nancial system less e⁄ective. Without
a commensurate improvement in the ￿nancial system, the quality of screening falls, slowing the
rate of technological innovation. But, this dynamic also creates opportunities for ￿nanciers.
Financiers can earn pro￿ts by developing improved screening methods that foster investments
in pro￿table, frontier technologies. We now develop a model to capture this intuition formally.
3 The Basic Structure of the Model
We begin with the discrete-time Schumpeterian growth model developed by AHM. Economic
activity occurs in k countries, which do not exchange goods or factors of production, but do
use each others￿technological ideas. There is a continuum of individuals in each country. Each
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quantities coincide. Each individual lives two periods and is endowed with three units of labor
in the ￿rst period and none in the second. The utility function is linear in consumption, so
that U = c1 + ￿c2; where c1 is consumption in the ￿rst period of life, c2 is consumption in
the second period of life, and ￿ 2 (0;1) is the rate at which individuals discount the utility of
consumption in period 2 relative to that in period 1.
3.1 Final Output
In every period the economy produces a ￿nal good combining labor and a continuum of spe-
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where xi;t is the amount of intermediate good i in period t with technology level of Ai;t: N is
the labor supply. The ￿nal good Z is used for consumption, as an input into entrepreneurial
and ￿nancial innovation, and an input into the production of intermediate goods.
The production of the ￿nal good, which we de￿ne as the numeraire, occurs under perfectly








In each intermediate goods sector i, a continuum of individuals with an entrepreneurial idea is
born in period t ￿ 1. Only one entrepreneur in a sector has a capable idea, i.e., an idea with a
positive probability of producing a successful innovation for period t:
The quality of each entrepreneurial idea is unknown both to the entrepreneur and to
households looking to invest in entrepreneurial ideas, which generates a demand for "screening."
As we detail below, ￿nanciers arise to screen entrepreneurial ideas; that is, ￿nanciers arise to
engage in the costly, risky, and potentially pro￿table process of identifying which entrepreneur
is capable of innovating. Then, based on the screening assessments of ￿nanciers, households
fund the entrepreneur designated as capable.2
2The assumption that entrepreneurs do not know whether their entrepreneurial idea is pro￿table is (1)
important and (2) well documented. If entrepreneurs know that they have zero probability of successfully
innovating, then they will not ask for funding because they only receive pro￿ts from a successful innovation.
Hence, there would be no demand for ￿nancial screening. The historical examples presented in section 2, along
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i;t equal the probability that the capable entrepreneur successfully innovates, so
that the level of technology of intermediate goods sector i in period t, Ai;t, is de￿ned as:
Ai;t =
( ￿ At with probability ￿e
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where ￿ At is the world technology frontier. Following AHM, Aghion and Howitt (2009), and
several multi-country models of endogenous growth, technological innovation￿ or, more accu-
rately, technological transfer￿ involves the costly, uncertain process of adapting ideas from the
world technology frontier to the domestic economy. Innovation is necessary to transfer a tech-
nology because technology and technological expertise have tacit, country-speci￿c qualities.
Thus, when the capable entrepreneur successfully innovates, the level of technology jumps to
￿ At. This world technology frontier grows at a constant rate g, which is taken as given for now,
but which we derive formally below.
A successful innovator enjoys a production cost advantage over entrepreneurs who do
not innovate. A successful innovator can produce intermediate goods at the rate of one unit
of intermediate good per one unit of ￿nal good as input. Entrepreneurs who do not innovate
can produce at the rate of one unit of intermediate good per ￿ units of ￿nal good as input,
where ￿ > 1. In every intermediate sector, there exists an unlimited number of people￿ the
competitive fringe￿ capable of producing at the rate of one unit of intermediate good per ￿
units of the ￿nal good as input.
Thus, successful innovators become the sole producers in their respective intermediate
sectors. They charge a price equal to the unit cost of the competitive fringe (￿) and earn
monopoly pro￿ts for one period. In intermediate goods sectors where entrepreneurial innovation
is unsuccessful, production occurs under perfectly competitive conditions, so that the price
equals the unit cost of the competitive fringe (￿) and unsuccessful innovators earn zero pro￿ts.
Thus, in all intermediate goods sectors, the price, pit, equals ￿.
Successful innovators earn monopoly pro￿ts for one period. After that period, the in-
cumbent monopolist dies and her technology can be imitated costlessly within the country.3
Using the demand function for intermediate goods from equation (2), the quantity demanded
with work by Chernow (1990), Goetzmann and Rouwenhorst (2005), Gompers and Lerner (2001), Schweitzer
(2006), and Tufano (2003), indicate that ￿nanciers provide information both to investors and entrepreneurs
about the pro￿tability of entrepreneurial ideas. For example, venture capitalists provide guidance to high-tech
innovators about the marketability and value of their ideas.
3As stated above￿ and as emphasized throughout the endogenous growth literature, we assume that it is
costly to transfer technologies from the world technology frontier to a particular country.








Since pro￿ts per intermediate good equal ￿ ￿ 1, a successful innovator in sector i earns pro￿ts
of:








Financiers screen entrepreneurs to ￿nd the capable one. In return for their screening services,
￿nanciers are paid a share of entrepreneurial pro￿ts which we describe formally below. Fi-
nanciers provide their assessments to households and entrepreneurs, who use this information
to make investment decisions. Thus, ￿nanciers screen and households fund entrepreneurial
innovation. In the absence of ￿nanciers that screen entrepreneurial ideas, innovative activity
ceases because households are unwilling to provide resources to a non-screened entrepreneur
since the probability of the project being successful is of measure zero. For the same reason,
households do not invest in entrepreneurs that ￿nanciers designate as incapable of innovating.
For each intermediate good sector i, there is one person born each period t ￿ 1 who
is capable of a successful ￿nancial innovation that improves the screening technology next
period. A successful ￿nancial innovation in sector i allows the respective ￿nancier to identify
the capable entrepreneur in sector i with probability one. In the absence of successful ￿nancial
innovation, there is a positive probability that ￿nanciers designate the wrong entrepreneur as
capable and the economy invests in the wrong entrepreneur.
Let ￿
f
i;t equal the probability that a ￿nancier successfully innovates and improves the
screening technology in sector i, so that the level of screening technology in intermediate goods
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For symmetry and simplicity of notation, we index the world screening frontier by the world
technology frontier, ￿ At. As the technological frontier advances, the frontier screening technology
also advances, though the actual screening technology, mt, may lag behind the frontier screening
technology, ￿ At. As with entrepreneurial innovation, ￿nancial innovation involves the costly and
11risky process of transferring screening methodologies from the world frontier to a particular
country. As with intermediate goods technology, screening and ￿nancial expertise have tacit,
country-speci￿c qualities that must be addressed in adapting frontier screening technology to
any particular country.
The successful ￿nancial innovator in a sector has a clear advantage over other ￿nanciers.
The successful ￿nancial innovator identi￿es the capable entrepreneur with probability one and
is the monopolist provider of the frontier screening technology, ￿ At. An unsuccessful ￿nancial
innovator becomes part of an unlimited number of individuals￿ a competitive fringe￿ that
can screen entrepreneurial ideas in sector i during period t using the common economy-wide
screening technology of period t ￿ 1, mt￿1. As with technological entrepreneurs, we assume
that it is costless within a country to imitate the screening technology from last period, so that
a successful ￿nancial innovator maintains the monopoly position for only one period.
We make the simplifying assumption that everyone in a country in period t has free access
to a common, economy-wide screening technology that equals the average of the screening
technologies across all sectors in period t ￿ 1, mt￿1. Mechanically, this assumption means
that we do not have to keep track of the distance of each sector￿ s screening technology from
the frontier level; rather, we can simply trace the average distance from the frontier across
all sectors in a country. The intuition underlying this simplifying assumption is that (a) last
period￿ s screening technologies can be costlessly used by all sectors within a country and (b)
when entrepreneurs in each sector try to innovate to attain the world technology frontier, ￿ At,
such innovative activity involves using technological ideas from multiple sectors. For example,
bio-tech innovation in period t will typically involve the use of recent innovations in information
technology, chemistry, and other sectors, so that screening bio-tech entrepreneurs in period t
requires an ability to screen technologies from these other sectors as well. Thus, the common
screening technology in period t is an amalgam of each sector￿ s screening technology from
period t ￿ 1, which is freely available within the country in period t.
This simplifying assumption, however, is not qualitatively important. For example,
rather than de￿ning the common, economy-wide screening technology as the average of last
period￿ s screening technologies, we could de￿ne the common, economy-wide screening technol-
ogy as the maximum screening technology across all sectors in the last period. This yields the
same qualitative predictions. Indeed, for the common, economy-wide screening technology, we
could choose any point in the distribution of sector-speci￿c screening technologies from last
12period without loss of generality.4
The probability that the ￿nancier in sector i correctly identi￿es the capable entrepreneur,
￿i;t, is a function of the gap between the level of the intermediate sector￿ s frontier technology
and the level of the screening technology. If the ￿nancier successfully innovates (which occurs
with probability ￿
f
i;t), then there is no gap, so the ￿nancier identi￿es the capable entrepre-
neur with probability one. If the ￿nancier does not successfully innovate (which occurs with
probability 1￿￿
f
i;t), then the ￿nancial gap in period t re￿ ects the di⁄erence between the tech-
nological frontier and last period￿ s common, economy-wide screening technology, such that the
probability of correctly identifying the capable entrepreneur is less than one. More speci￿cally,




￿ At= ￿ At = 1 with probability ￿
f
i;t
mt￿1= ￿ At =
￿t￿1







where, as described above, g is the growth rate of the world technology leader. Note that
within a sector, every ￿nancier in the competitive fringe has the same screening technology
and therefore identi￿es the same entrepreneur as the capable entrepreneur. Consequently,
households ￿nance only one entrepreneur in a sector. Across sectors in which ￿nanciers did not
successfully innovate, the ￿nanciers correctly identify the capable entrepreneur in ￿t sectors,
whereas in 1 ￿ ￿t sectors, these ￿nanciers identify￿ and households ￿nance￿ an incapable
entrepreneur. Formally, the production of screening from the competitive fringe of ￿nanciers
is deterministic within a sector but stochastic across sectors.
In the presence of technological innovation in the world frontier but in the absence of
domestic ￿nancial innovation, the screening technology becomes increasingly ine⁄ective at iden-
tifying the capable entrepreneur. This growing ￿nancial gap reduces the probability that the
society invests in the best entrepreneurial ideas with adverse rami￿cations on technological
change. More formally, as technology advances (as ￿ At increases) and without a concomi-
tant advance in the screening technology, mi;t, the probability that the ￿nancier successfully
identi￿es￿ and households fund￿ the capable entrepreneur, ￿i;t = mi;t= ￿ At, falls.
Financiers are paid by entrepreneurs in the form of a share, ￿i;t, of entrepreneurial
pro￿ts. Though all screened entrepreneurs sign a perfectly enforceable contract regarding this
share, only one entrepreneur in a sector is designated as capable by ￿nanciers. This designated
entrepreneur, therefore, is the only one in the sector that receives capital from households.
4Allowing each intermediate sector to maintain its own screening technology over time delivers a cumbersome
analysis without changing the model￿ s qualitative predictions.
13The ￿nancier￿ s fraction of entrepreneurial pro￿ts, ￿i;t, is determined endogenously in
the model. In sectors with successful ￿nancial innovation, the successful ￿nancier is the sole
provider of the frontier screening technology and charges a monopoly price in the form of a
high share of entrepreneurial pro￿ts. More speci￿cally, the successful, monopolist ￿nancier
charges a price such that the entrepreneur is indi⁄erent between using the frontier screening
technology and using the old screening technology available to the competitive fringe. For
simplicity but without loss of generality, we assume that the perfectly competitive fringe can
provide the old screening technology at zero cost, so that entrepreneurs using the competitive
fringe of ￿nanciers keep 100% of the pro￿ts.
3.4 Timing of Events
At the beginning of period t ￿ 1 in each sector of each country, the capable ￿nancier borrows
money from households and invests in ￿nancial innovation. If the ￿nancier successfully inno-
vates, then this new screening technology identi￿es the capable entrepreneur with probability
one in period t and this ￿nancier becomes the monopolist seller of screening services in the
sector. There always exists a competitive fringe of ￿nanciers that can provide screening ser-
vices using the old screening technology from period t￿1. Unscreened entrepreneurs in sector
i solicit screening from ￿nanciers in sector i. As we show, if a ￿nancier innovates, entrepre-
neurs contract with her. If the capable ￿nancier does not innovate, they contract with the
competitive fringe. Next, the entrepreneur designated as capable by a ￿nancier borrows from
households and invests in innovation.
In this paper, pro￿t-maximizing ￿nanciers arise to screen entrepreneurs. While previous
Schumpeterian growth models, e.g., Aghion and Howitt (2009), assume that the identity of
the capable entrepreneur is costlessly available to everyone, we do not. Identifying the capable
entrepreneur is a costly, risky, and potentially pro￿table activity that motivates the emergence
of ￿nanciers. However, we do not examine the screening of the screeners. So, we assume that
the capable ￿nancier is common knowledge, which is consistent with core models of ￿nancial
intermediation, such as Diamond (1984) and Boyd and Prescott (1986), in which the screening
of ￿nanciers is much less costly than the screening of entrepreneurs.
In period t, uncertainty about entrepreneurial innovation is resolved. If the entrepreneur
successfully innovates, she repays the households for their investment in innovation, pays the
contracted fraction of pro￿ts to the ￿nancier, and keeps the remaining pro￿ts. If the ￿nancier
and entrepreneur successfully innovate, then the ￿nancier pays back households who lent money
14for ￿nancial innovation.
Figure 1 below summarizes all possible scenarios.
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4 Innovation and Aggregate Growth
4.1 Entrepreneurial Innovation
The probability that a capable entrepreneur successfully innovates in period t, ￿e
i;t, depends





i;t)￿ ￿ At; ￿ > 1: (8)
As in AHM, the cost of entrepreneurial innovation in terms of ￿nal goods input increases
proportionally with the world technology frontier, ￿ At, so that it becomes more expensive to
maintain an innovation rate of ￿e
i;t as the technology frontier advances. Moreover, ￿ is a an
economy-wide constant re￿ ecting institutional and other characteristics that a⁄ect the cost of
innovation at every level of technological sophistication.
15In equilibrium, each capable entrepreneur chooses Ne
i;t￿1 to maximize expected prof-
its. Given the contractual agreement between entrepreneurs and ￿nanciers, the entrepreneur




i;t = (1 ￿ ￿i;t)
￿
￿￿e




Risk-neutral individuals in the ￿rst period of life provide resources to entrepreneurs
designated as capable by ￿nanciers.5 They provide resources to entrepreneurs at a sector-
speci￿c interest rate that is an inverse function of the quality of the screening technology in
the sector. De￿ning the risk free interest rate as r = 1=￿ ￿ 1, the interest rate charged to
an entrepreneur that is rated as capable by a successful ￿nancier is Re
i;t = 1+r
￿e
i;t . In turn,
households charge the interest rate of Re
i;t = 1+r
￿i;t￿e
i;t to entrepreneurs designated as capable
by the competitive fringe of ￿nanciers that conducted the screening using the economy-wide
screening technology from the last period. Recall that ￿i;t = 1 for ￿nanciers that successfully
innovate, so these two interest rates are fully consistent.
Consider ￿rst entrepreneurs that are screened by successful ￿nanciers, so that the entre-
preneur designated as capable knows with probability one that she is the capable entrepreneur.
The pro￿t maximizing probability of entrepreneurial innovation comes from maximizing (9) by
choosing ￿e








where we assume that ￿￿ < ￿￿￿ to ensure that the equilibrium probability of successful en-
trepreneurial innovation is less than one (￿￿
e;t < 1) under perfect ￿nancial screening. Since
entrepreneurs repay ￿nanciers only when they successfully innovate, ￿i;t does not a⁄ect invest-
ment in entrepreneurial innovation.
From (10), the comparative statics when a ￿nancier successfully innovates are intuitively.
Entrepreneurs invest more in innovation and boost the probability of success when (1) the net
5We assume that all investment is domestically ￿nanced, but allowing for perfect international capital mobility
would not change the analysis given the structure of the model. First, as explained by AHM, linear utility with
a constant discount rate implies that individuals are indi⁄erent between investing domestically or abroad, so
that perfect capital mobility yields the same results. Second, we treat ￿nancial and technological innovation
symmetrically: Entrepreneurs in a country must engage in the costly, risky process of adapting a technology
from the frontier country to their domestic market. Similarly, ￿nanciers must engage in the costly, risky process
of adapting a screening methodology from the frontier country to a particular domestic market. Whether the
￿nancier that undertakes these costly, risky "innovations" is domestic or foreign is irrelevant for our purposes.
16pro￿ts per unit of the intermediate good, ￿, are higher and (2) the cost of entrepreneurial
innovation, ￿; is lower. If ￿ and ￿ are common across sectors, then ￿e￿
i;t = ￿e￿ 8 i.
Substituting (10) into (9) yields the net expected pro￿ts of an entrepreneur screened by
a successful ￿nancier,
￿e￿
i;t = (1 ￿ ￿i;t)￿e￿’ ￿ At; (11)
where ’ = ￿￿(1 ￿ 1=￿):
Now, consider entrepreneurs screened by the competitive fringe of ￿nanciers using the
old, imperfect screening technology, mt￿1. Under these conditions, the entrepreneur keeps all
the pro￿ts, so that ￿i;t = 0. Thus, the expected pro￿ts to an imperfectly screened entrepreneur,
￿e0




i;t￿ ￿ At ￿ Ne
t￿1: (12)








Substituting (13) in (12) one derives the maximal net expected revenue of an entrepreneur




￿￿1 ￿e￿’ ￿ At: (14)
The following Lemma establishes the properties of entrepreneurial innovation in sector i
when using the old screening technology, ￿i;t,
Lemma 1 The properties of entrepreneurial innovation in sectors using the old, imperfect
screening technology:
1. Entrepreneurs invest more in innovation and boost the probability of successful innovation
when (1) the net pro￿ts per unit of the intermediate good, ￿, are higher and (2) the cost













17Proof. These properties follow by directly di⁄erentiating equation (13). ￿
We can now derive the fraction of entrepreneurial pro￿ts accruing to the entrepreneur
(1 ￿ ￿i;t) and the ￿nancier (￿i;t). For the unscreened entrepreneurs in the beginning of period
t ￿ 1 to be indi⁄erent between choosing a contract with a successful ￿nancier or using the
economy-wide screening technology supplied by the competitive fringe, these two alternatives
must deliver the same expected pro￿ts. Formally, (11) must equal (14), so that:
￿i;t = 1 ￿ (￿i;t)
￿
￿￿1 : (15)
Equation (15) indicates that the better is the economy￿ s ￿nancial screening capacity
(higher ￿i;t) the lower is the fraction of entrepreneurial pro￿ts (￿i;t) that a successful ￿nancier
can demand. This occurs because if the standard screening technology is close to the frontier
screening technology, then the competitive fringe o⁄ers a close substitute. On the other hand,
if the available screening technology is a poor substitute for a successful ￿nancier￿ s newly
developed screening capabilities, then the ￿nancier can obtain a larger fraction of expected
entrepreneurial pro￿ts.
4.2 Financial Innovation
As with entrepreneurial innovation, the probability that the capable ￿nancier in sector i suc-
cessfully innovates during period t ￿ 1 and identi￿es the entrepreneur capable of innovation in
period t, ￿
f
i;t, depends positively on the amount of resources invested in ￿nancial innovation







i;t)￿ ￿ At; ￿ > 1; (16)
where the cost of ￿nancial innovation in terms of the ￿nal goods input increases proportionally
with the world technology frontier, ￿ At. Thus, it becomes more expensive to maintain the same
rate of ￿nancial innovation, ￿
f
i;t, as the technological frontier advances since the entrepreneurs
that are screened by ￿nanciers are striving to reach the world technology frontier.
The ￿nancier chooses N
f
i;t￿1 to maximize expected pro￿ts, ￿
f
i;t. Since a successfully in-
novating ￿nancier keeps the fraction ￿i;t of expected entrepreneurial pro￿ts, ￿e￿










The ￿nancier maximizes pro￿ts by borrowing N
f
i;t￿1 worth of ￿nal goods and investing
these resources in ￿nancial innovation. Risk-neutral individuals lend to ￿nanciers seeking to







, which is a function of the risk free interest
rate, r, the probability that the ￿nancier successfully innovates, and the probability that the
entrepreneur designated by the ￿nancier as capable successfully innovates. After substituting
(15) into (17), the ￿nancier chooses to borrow and invest in ￿nancial innovation such that the















where we assume that ￿f > ￿ to ensure that the rate of ￿nancial innovation is always less than
one.
4.3 Aggregating the Financial System
To examine the e¢ ciency of a country￿ s ￿nancial system, we aggregate the behavior of ￿nanciers
across individual sectors to focus on the average, or representative, probability that a ￿nancier





where ￿i;t equals the probability that the ￿nancier in sector i correctly identi￿es the entrepre-
neur capable of innovating in sector i during period t. From equation (7), the average level of
￿nancial e¢ ciency evolves according to the following equation:
￿t = ￿
f






The ￿nancial sector identi￿es the capable entrepreneur with probability one in the fraction ￿
f
t
of the sectors in which the ￿nancier successfully innovated last period. Since we aggregate
￿nancial screening across a continuum of sectors, we ignore negligible relative size di⁄erences.
In the remaining 1 ￿ ￿
f
t of the sectors, the ￿nancial sector identi￿es the capable entrepreneur
with a probability of
￿t￿1
1+g < 1.
To obtain the steady state level of average ￿nancial screening, let ￿t = ￿t￿1 = ￿￿ and
￿
f
t = ￿f￿ in the steady state and then solve for ￿￿ in equation (19):
￿￿ =
￿f￿
g + ￿f￿ : (20)
Directly di⁄erentiating equation (20) reveals an important comparative static of this
economy:
19@￿￿
@￿f￿ > 0: (21)
The higher is the steady state rate of ￿nancial innovation, ￿f￿; the more e¢ cient is the econ-
omy￿ s ￿nancial system at identifying capable entrepreneurs in the steady state, ￿￿.
The steady state pro￿t maximizing innovation probability of the ￿nancial system is












Finally, combining (20) and (22), yields the implicit function:
F(￿e￿;￿f￿;￿f) ￿ 0; (23)
which characterizes the equilibrium innovation rate of the ￿nancial system. The following
Lemma summarizes the properties of an economy￿ s ￿nancial innovation rate:
Lemma 2 The properties of ￿nancial innovation in the steady state
1. Financial innovation is an increasing function of the rate at which entrepreneurs innovate:
@￿f￿
@￿e￿ > 0:













Proof. Repeated di⁄erentiation of equation (22) according to the Implicit Function Theorem
delivers the results. ￿
We present the comparative statics of ￿
f￿
t with respect to entrepreneurial innovation ￿e￿
in order to highlight the nexus between entrepreneurial and ￿nancial innovation. Of course,
it is trivial to show that since ￿e￿ itself is a function of exogenous features of the economy
20(￿;￿), (part 1 of Lemma 1), changes in these structural parameters will a⁄ect the equilibrium
￿nancial innovation.
Stagnant entrepreneurial innovation reduces the expected pro￿ts from ￿nancial inno-
vation, which in turn (a) reduces investment in ￿nancial innovation, (b) slows the rate of
improvement in the screening technology, (c) lowers the probability that ￿nanciers identify
capable entrepreneurs, and hence (d) impedes technological innovation and growth. Put dif-
ferently, there is a multiplier e⁄ect associated with changes in entrepreneurial innovation that
reverberates through the rate of ￿nancial innovation back to the rate of technological change.
Policies, regulations, and institutions that impede ￿nancial innovation have large e⁄ects
on the rate of technological innovation. Thus, countries in which it is more expensive to
innovate ￿nancially (higher ￿f) will tend to experience slower rates of technological growth.
Cross-economy di⁄erences in the cost of ￿nancial innovation can arise for many reasons. For
example, a large literature suggests that some legal systems (for example those that rely on
case law) are more conducive to ￿nancial innovation than other systems (such as those that
rely less heavily on case law to adapt to changing conditions), which has been documented by
Levine (2005b), Gennaioli and Shleifer (2007), and Levine (2005a, 2005b). More on this in the
empirical section of the paper.
4.4 Aggregate Economic Activity
This section aggregates an economy￿ s economic activity and examines its components. We





where aggregation is performed across the continuum of intermediate sectors.
To derive the law of motion of the average level of technological productivity, note that







t. Then, one can simply use the branches of Figure 1 and






















Inspecting (24) reveals that a country￿ s average technological productivity in period t + 1 is a
weighted average of sectors which implement the frontier technology, ￿ At+1; and of sectors using
21the average technology of period t; At. The weights are functions of (a) the rate of ￿nancial
innovation, ￿
f
t+1, (b) the quality of the ￿nancial screening technology, ￿t+1, and (c) the proba-
bility of successful entrepreneurial innovation, ￿e
t+1. In particular, the productivity parameter
will equal ￿ At+1 both in sectors where ￿nanciers and entrepreneurs successfully innovated and
in sectors where ￿nanciers did not ￿nancially innovate, but nevertheless correctly identi￿ed the
capable entrepreneur, who in turn successfully innovated.
To derive the per capita gross domestic product within a country, note that it is composed
of wages in the ￿nal goods sector and pro￿ts in the intermediate goods and ￿nancial sectors.
In terms of wages, note that ￿nal good production can be summarized by Zt = ￿At where
￿ = (￿=￿)￿=(1￿￿), which may be derived by substituting (4) into (1). Since by assumption
the ￿nal goods sector is competitive, the wage rate wt is the marginal product of labor in
the production of the ￿nal good, so that wt = (1 ￿ ￿)Zt = (1 ￿ ￿)￿At.6 In terms of pro￿ts,





1￿￿. Thus, per capita gross domestic
product is the sum of added value across sectors:
Yt = wt + ￿t￿t = (1 ￿ ￿)￿At + ￿t￿At ; (25)
where ￿t is the fraction of goods￿sectors with successful entrepreneurial innovation in period
t.
The following section characterizes the growth rate of Yt as a function of the underlying
entrepreneurial and ￿nancial structure of the economy.
4.5 Equilibrium Economic Performance Across Countries
Denote a country￿ s inverse distance from the world technological frontier as at = At= ￿ At. Each
economy takes the evolution of the frontier as given (see below how this is derived). Thus, the

























at ￿ H(at) :
(26)
6Unlike AHM where the proportionality of the wage rate to the domestic productivity determines the level
of technology investment in a credit-constrained country, this ratio plays no role in determining entrepreneurial
investment in our model. As shown in equations (10) and (13), the probability of entrepreneurial innovation
depends only on entrepreneurial pro￿ts and the level of the ￿nancial screening technology available to those
in sectors where ￿nanciers did not successfully innovate. Domestic productivity determines the amount that a
￿nancier and an entrepreneur can borrow from households in period t. Since we assume that neither ￿nanciers
nor entrepreneurs can hide the proceeds, households are willing to lend any amount at the prevailing interest
rates.
22This converges in the long run to the steady state value:
ass =
(1 + g)￿￿
g + ￿￿ ;
where ￿￿ = ￿f￿￿e￿+(1￿￿f￿)(￿￿)
1=(￿￿1) ￿e￿ is the fraction of entrepreneurially innovating
sectors.
As in other multi-country Schumpeterian models, the growth rate of the technological
frontier is determined by the equilibrium rate of entrepreneurial innovations in the leading










The following Proposition summarizes the properties of an economy trying to implement
the world technology frontier.
Proposition 1 An economy￿ s steady state technology gap displays the following properties:
1. An economy blocking ￿nancial innovation will eventually stagnate irrespective of the ini-
tial level of screening technology, ￿t:
ass = 0 if ￿f￿ = 0:
2. The steady state technology gap is increasing at the rate of ￿nancial innovation, ￿f￿; i.e.,
@ass
@￿f￿ > 0:




Proof. The ￿rst property is obtained through direct substitution of ￿f￿ = 0 in ass: The remain-
ing two properties are derived by di⁄erentiating ass with respect to the relevant arguments.￿
It is straightforward to derive the ultimate determinants of the steady state technological
gap, ass; in terms of the exogenous parameters using the results established in part 1 of Lemma
1 and parts 1 and 2 of Lemma 2. The next section brie￿ y discusses the derived properties.
7There is no need to explicitly specify the size of innovation for the leader since it does not a⁄ect the
equilibrium innovation probability. To see that, assume that the leader￿ s technological jump from period t ￿ 1;
is h > 1; i.e. At = hAt￿1. Looking at (9) it becomes clear that the size of the jump, h; multiplies both the
expected revenues and the innovation costs leaving the equilibrium rate of entrepreneurial innovation una⁄ected.
234.6 Dynamic versus Static Financial Markets
The model economy predicts that regardless of the screening capability of the ￿nancial system in
period t, ￿t, anything that prohibits ￿nancial innovation will eventually stop economic growth
as illustrated in Figure 2a.
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Figure 2a: Static Financial Markets
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Figure 2b: Dynamic Financial Markets
Initially, the consequences of impeding innovation may have negligible e⁄ects on the
rate of entrepreneurial innovation if the initial e¢ ciency of the screening technology is high.
Inevitably, however, as the world technology frontier advances and renders the initial screen-
ing technology increasingly obsolete, the absence of ￿nancial innovation produces a large and
growing gap between actual and potential growth.
Graphically, this scenario is equivalent to the H(at) curve in Figure 2b shifting downwards
over time in the absence of ￿nancial innovation￿ with H(at) given by equation (26) Eventually,
the H(at) curve hits the origin as in Figure 2a. This ￿nancially induced poverty trap is not
caused by standard credit constraints. Rather, it arises because ￿nanciers fail to innovate and
improve the screening technology in tandem with the world-technology frontier. Introducing
￿nancial innovation in such a dormant ￿nancial system will boost growth, allowing for conver-
gence to the world growth rate. It is straightforward to show this by verifying that the per
capita gross domestic product in a ￿nancially innovating economy, i.e. ￿f￿ > 0; derived in (25),
grows at the rate of the world technology frontier.
Due to the synergies between ￿nancial and entrepreneurial innovation, interventions in
either sector have an amplifying e⁄ect on the economy￿ s innovation rate. For instance, among
24economies that invest in ￿nancial innovation, further decreasing the barriers to ￿nancial inno-
vation will shift the H(at) curve upwards in Figure 2b, increasing a country￿ s steady state level
of technology relative to the frontier, ass. In a similar fashion, factors a⁄ecting entrepreneurial
innovation also shape a country￿ s steady state technology gap.
4.7 Rent-seeking Financial Innovation
So far, ￿nanciers generate pro￿ts only by innovating and creating a superior screening method-
ology. Financiers provide privately pro￿table and socially bene￿cial services.
In practice, however, ￿nanciers can engage in activities that are privately pro￿table but
socially ine¢ cient, which we call rent-seeking activities. For example, a ￿nancier could expend
resources seeking to limit competition, either through private means or by lobbying regulators to
implement protective policies. This would allow the rent-seeking ￿nancier to extract monopolist
rents by providing the freely available screening methodology from last period. And, the rent-
seeking ￿nancier would obtain these rents without having to engage in the comparatively costly
process of trying to innovate to develop an improved screening methodology. Such rent-seeking
activity does not improve screening and therefore does not foster economic growth. Indeed,
recent research by Keys et al (2010) stresses that one recent ￿nancial innovation, securitization,
did not improve screening.
In this subsection, we highlight the importance of the incentive structure that ￿nanciers
face as they choose between investing in ￿nancial innovation that can improve screening or in
rent-seeking activities that do not improve screening but that can yield monopolistic rents. For
simplicity, we model rent seeking as the capable ￿nancier investing in activities that increase
the production costs of the competitive fringe of ￿nanciers. Thus, a successful rent-seeking
investment means the ￿nancier can provide the freely available screening methodology from
last period at a lower cost than competitors and therefore charge a monopoly price for this
screening methodology, re￿ ecting impediments to competition.
Thus, we assume that the capable ￿nancier faces a two-stage maximization problem. In
the ￿rst stage, she decides how much to invest in ￿nancial innovation to improve screening. In
the second stage, if ￿nancial innovation is unsuccessful, she decides how much to invest in rent
seeking. This problem is solved by backwards induction, i.e. ￿rst by analyzing the behavior of
the ￿nancial entrepreneur in case of unsuccessful ￿nancial innovation.
Formally, let bt be the fraction of the entrepreneurial pro￿ts that a rent-seeking ￿nancier
obtains from entrepreneurs using the common, economy-wide screening methodology. Invest-
25ment in rent seeking, Bt; is an increasing function of bt; and is proportional to the technological
frontier preserving the symmetry with the innovation costs, that is:
Bt = (￿bbt)￿ ￿ At; ￿ > 1; (28)
where ￿b measures the institutional costs of rent seeking, so that a large ￿b implies that it
is more di¢ cult for a rent-seeking ￿nancier to limit competition and extract monopoly rents
by employing the commonly available screening methodology. Consequently, expected pro￿ts
under rent seeking, R(bt); are given by:8
R(bt) = ￿bt￿e0
t ￿ Bt: (29)
The fraction of entrepreneurial pro￿ts obtained by the rent-seeking ￿nancier, bt, that










which obtains its steady state value, b￿ when ￿t = ￿￿:
The comparative statics are intuitive. A higher level of the standard screening technol-
ogy, ￿t; induces ￿nanciers to increase their rent-seeking e⁄orts because the improvements in
screening￿ and hence the potential pro￿ts￿ from pushing the screening methodology to the
world frontier are small. This ￿nding suggests that when a country￿ s ￿nancial system is close
to the screening frontier, this increases rent-seeking incentives. As we show below, increases in
rent seeking slow ￿nancial innovation and economic growth. At the same time, in economies
where institutions impose a higher cost on rent seeking, ￿b; ￿nanciers allocate fewer resources
towards rent seeking and, as we will now show, invest comparatively more in improving screen-
ing.




t) = ￿ At(b￿
t)￿(￿ ￿ 1): (31)
Having analyzed the behavior of the potential ￿nancier in case of unsuccessful innovation,
we now investigate the pro￿t maximizing rate of ￿nancial innovation in the presence of rent-
seeking opportunities. The key di⁄erence compared to the ￿nanciers￿expected pro￿ts described
8The potential ￿nancier borrows from households to ￿nance the rent seeking activity. Note that the only risk
associated with rent seeking is the probability that the imperfectly screened entrepreneur is unsuccessful.
26by (17) is that now the outside option of a potential ￿nancier is no longer zero pro￿ts but
the possibility of investing in rent seeking and impeding the use of the standard screening
methodology by the competitive fringe.
















Expected pro￿ts are maximized subject to (16), (15) and (31). Replacing ￿t with its equilibrium
















The following Lemma summarizes the properties of equilibrium ￿nancial innovation.







; are as follows:













Proof. The ￿rst property follows by directly comparing (22) to (33). The second one obtains
by di⁄erentiating (33) with respect to ￿b ￿
This Lemma has direct implications for the rates of ￿nancial and technological innovation.
In countries where it is comparatively attractive for ￿nanciers to engage in rent seeking￿ that
is, in countries where ￿nanciers can more easily become the monopolistic providers of commonly
available screening methodologies, ￿nanciers invest less in ￿nancial innovation. This reduces the
rate of improvement in screening methodologies and slows the rate of technological innovation.
This analysis of rent-seeking ￿nanciers within a model of Schumpeterian growth and
￿nancial innovation o⁄ers both policy implications and guidance for evaluating the model￿ s
predictions empirically. First, political, legal, and regulatory institutions that discourage rent
seeking and promote competition will tend to foster socially bene￿cial ￿nancial innovations that
27facilitate technological progress. In turn, institutions and policies that restrict competition in
￿nance and provide a high return to rent-seeking investments by ￿nanciers will tend to retard
￿nancial and technological innovation.
Second, the analysis provides guidance both on how to measure ￿nancial innovation and
on how not to measure ￿nancial innovation. In terms of what not to measure, computing the
investment expenditures or pro￿ts of ￿nanciers might re￿ ect rent-seeking activities or other
factors, not genuine ￿nancial innovations that improve screening technologies. Rather, it is
important to measure an actual improvement in a screening methodology and gauge how quickly
di⁄erent countries innovate to transfer the new screening technology to their country. Such a
direct measure of the adaptation and adoption of a new screening technologies would directly
capture the mechanics of the model.
5 Financial Innovation and Convergence: Cross-Country Evi-
dence
In this section, we evaluate a key feature of our model that di⁄ers from existing models of
￿nancial development and growth: Economies without ￿nancial innovation will stagnate, irre-
spective of the initial level of ￿nancial development.
This can be tested by extending the AHM regression framework to include not only
measures of ￿nancial development but also ￿nancial innovation. In particular, ￿rst consider
the AHM cross-country regression framework:
g ￿ g1 = b0 + b1F + b2(y ￿ y1) + b3F(y ￿ y1) + b4X + u; (34)
where g￿g1 is average growth rate of per capita income relative to U.S. growth over the period
1960-95, F is ￿nancial development in 1960, which is measured as credit to the private sector
as a share of GDP, y ￿ y1 is log of per capita income relative to U.S. per capita income, X is
set of control variables, and u is an error term.
AHM estimate this regression model using cross-sectional data on 63 countries over the
period 1960-1995. The data are from Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000), who found a positive,
large, and robust e⁄ect of ￿nancial intermediation on economic growth. Consistent with their
theoretical model, AHM ￿nd that b1 is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero and that b3 is
negative and signi￿cant. Thus, they ￿nd that ￿nancial development accelerates the rate at
which economies converge to the technological leader.
28In contrast to AHM, our model stresses the importance of ￿nancial innovation, not
￿nancial development. Indeed, in our model the level of ￿nancial development in any period
is an outcome of previous ￿nancial innovations. Building on our model above, we amend the
AHM regression framework as follows:
g ￿ g1 = b0 + b1F + b2(y ￿ y1) + b3F(y ￿ y1) + b4X + b5f + b6f(y ￿ y1) + u; (35)
where f denotes ￿nancial innovation over the sample period 1960-95. Our model predicts that
b6 < 0 : the likelihood and speed of convergence depends positively on ￿nancial innovation.
The model also predicts that b5 will be insigni￿cant, indicating a vanishing steady-state growth
e⁄ect. This prediction derives from the assumption than the technological leader already pos-
sesses a ￿nancial system that innovates at the growth maximizing rate, so that faster ￿nancial
innovation would not increase the probability of picking capable entrepreneurs. Note that f is
measured over the sample period, while F is measured at the beginning of the sample period.
We measure ￿nancial innovation in a country by how quickly the country adopts a
particular innovation associated with screening borrowers, namely the sharing of information
about creditors through a private bureau. This proxy for ￿nancial innovation is directly linked
with improvements in screening technology, which is the notion of ￿nancial innovation in our
theoretical model. Speci￿cally, we measure ￿nancial innovation, f, as the fraction of years
between 1960 and 1995 that a private credit bureau was in place. We obtain data on the year
of establishment of a private credit bureau from Djankov et al. (2007).
Private credit bureaus are organizations that provide credit information on individuals
and ￿rms. They are commonly established by private banks to share credit information about
the creditworthiness of borrowers. Such bureaus allow banks to obtain credit information on
customers of other banks and serve as an important screening mechanism for new borrowers.
As of 2003, private credit bureaus operated in 55 out of the 133 countries covered by Djankov
et al. (2007).
Theoretical and empirical research emphasizes both the importance of information in
shaping the allocation of credit and the particular role of credit bureaus in enhancing in-
formation dissemination and hence the functioning of the ￿nancial system. Consistent with
information-based theories of credit allocation (e.g., Ja⁄ee and Russel, 1976, and Stiglitz and
Weiss, 1981), Pagano and Jappelli (1993) ￿nd that the existence of a credit registry is an
important factor in determining credit availability. Djankov et al. (2007) show that the estab-
29lishment of private credit bureaus is especially useful in explaining cross-country di⁄erences in
￿nancial development.
We exploit an additional, testable implication of the model by examining public credit
registries. Credit information sharing arrangements can also be organized by the government
(typically the central bank) in the form of a public credit registry, which provides an additional
testable hypothesis. Although, in principle, such government-owned credit registries can deliver
the same type of credit information as private credit bureaus, these public registries are not
suitable empirical proxies for the private, pro￿t-maximizing ￿nancial innovators that are the
focus of our theoretical model. Private credit bureaus usually gather more information and o⁄er
a broader range of services to lenders than public credit registries according to Jappelli and
Pagano (2002). For example, the New Zealand private bureau o⁄ers credit scoring, borrower
monitoring, and debt collection services, in addition to traditional credit history information.
Thus, we also test the di⁄erential impact of private credit bureaus and public credit registries
on economic growth using data.
As an alternative measure of ￿nancial innovation, we use the average growth rate of
￿nancial development, F, over the period 1960-95. This is a catch-all measure of ￿nancial
innovation that simply measures the change in ￿nancial development over our sample period.
However, we prefer the measure of ￿nancial innovation based on establishing a private credit
bureau because it is more closely linked to the mechanisms underlying ￿nancial innovation in
our model.
For comparison purposes, we test the empirical predictions of our model using the same
dataset and the same set of control variables, X, as in Levine et al. (2000) and AHM. These
control variables includes measures of educational attainment (school), government size (gov),
in￿ ation (pi), black market premium (bmp), openness to trade (trade), revolutions and coups
(revc), political assassinations (assass), and ethnic diversity (avelf). The summary statistics
of our main regression variables, including data de￿nitions, are reported in Table 1.
We follow Levine et al. (2000) and AHM in using private credit to GDP as our preferred
measure of ￿nancial development. This is the value of credits by ￿nancial intermediaries to
the private sector, divided by GDP, and excludes credit granted to the public sector and
credit granted by the central bank and development banks. We also report results below using
alternative measures of ￿nancial development, including the ratio of liquid liabilities of banks
to GDP and the ratio of bank assets to GDP (following Levine et al. (2000) and AHM), an
index of creditor rights (following Djankov et al., 2007), and an index of accounting standards
30(following Rajan and Zingales, 1998).
We start by running a simple cross-country OLS regression, limiting the sample to coun-
tries with data on the initial level of ￿nancial development in 1960. This limits the sample
to 56 countries, as compared to AHM who use average private credit over the period 1960-95.
Our results are unaltered when we use average private credit. We prefer to use the initial
level of private credit because it is more tightly linked to the theoretical model and because
using the initial value helps distinguish between ￿nancial development and the rate of ￿nancial
innovation during the sample period. The regression results from estimating equation (34) are
presented in the ￿rst column of Table 2. These regression results con￿rm the AHM ￿ndings of
a negative interaction between ￿nancial development, F, and the deviation of initial per capita
income from US per capita income, (y ￿ y1). The estimated value of b1 is not signi￿cantly
di⁄erent from zero and the estimated value of b3 is negative and statistically signi￿cant.
Next, we estimate equation (35), which incorporates ￿nancial innovation. Thus, we
evaluate the role of ￿nancial innovation in driving the speed of convergence of economies to
the growth path of the technological leader. The sample reduces to 51 countries due to missing
data on the screening innovation variable. These results are also reported in Table 2.
Consistent with the central empirical prediction from our model, the interaction between
￿nancial innovation, f, and deviation of growth from U.S. growth (y ￿ y1) is negative and
signi￿cant. The estimated value of b5 (the coe¢ cient on f) is not statistically di⁄erent from
zero, but the estimated value of b6 (-1.70, which is the coe¢ cient on f(y ￿ y1) is negative and
statistically signi￿cant. Thus, when incorporating ￿nancial innovation, the level of ￿nancial
development does not help explain growth convergence, but ￿nancial innovation helps account
for the speed of convergence when conditioning on many other factors, including the level of
￿nancial development and its interaction with initial income di⁄erentials.
The economic e⁄ect of this result is large. A one standard deviation increase in ￿nancial
innovation (0.39) implies an increase in growth relative to U.S. growth (g ￿g1) for a country￿ s
whose initial per capita income is one standard deviation below that of the U.S. of about 0.53.
This is large since the standard deviation of the growth di⁄erential with the U.S. in the sample
is about 1.7. In other words, the e⁄ect amounts to about one-third the standard deviation in
growth di⁄erentials.
Next, we run two sets of instrumental variables (IV) regressions to address concerns
about endogeneity between growth, ￿nancial development and ￿nancial innovation. We follow
AHM, instrumenting for F and F(y ￿ y1) using legal origin, L, and legal origin interacted
31with initial relative output (L(y ￿ y1)). Legal origin is a set of three dummy variables, ￿rst
used by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), indicating whether the country￿ s legal system is based
on French, English, German, or Scandinavian traditions. La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) argue
that legal origin explains variation in the protection of the rights of shareholders and creditors.
Levine et al. (2000) argue that legal origin constitutes a good set of instruments for ￿nancial
development because they are predetermined variables, have a bearing on the enforceability of
￿nancial contracts, and have a strong e⁄ect on ￿nancial development, and should a⁄ect growth
primarily though their impact on ￿nancial development.
As an instrument for ￿nancial innovation, f, we use a measure of the degree of ￿nancial
reforms that ease restrictions on the operation of the ￿nancial system, which in turn encourages
￿nanciers to invest more in innovation to enhance screening and less in rent-seeking activities.
Speci￿cally, we use the change over the period 1973-1995 in the Abiad and Mody (2005) ￿nancial
reform index, R, as instrument for f, and instrument f(y ￿ y1) using R(y ￿ y1). Abiad and
Mody (2005) create an aggregate country-level index of ￿nancial reform for a sample of 35
countries over the period 1973-1996 by aggregating six subcomponents that each obtain a score
between 0 and 3, with higher scores denoting more liberalization. The six policy components
relate to credit controls, interest rate controls, entry barriers in the banking sector, operational
restrictions, privatization in the ￿nancial sector, and restrictions on international ￿nancial
transactions. We use the relative change in this aggregate index over the period 1973-1995 as
proxy for ￿nancial deregulation at the country level.
Using an index of ￿nancial liberalization as an instrument for ￿nancial innovation is
motivated by research on how deregulation in the U.S. banking industry enhanced ￿nancial
innovation and e¢ ciency. For example, Silber (1983) and Kane (1983 and 1988) argued that ￿-
nancial deregulation was an important underlying force behind U.S. ￿nancial sector innovations
in the 1970s and early 1980s, while Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) ￿nd that the U.S. banking
industry became signi￿cantly more e¢ cient following ￿nancial deregulation during the 1980s.
They show that noninterest costs fell, wages fell, and loan losses fell after states deregulated
branching.
Our identi￿cation strategy hinges on the validity of our choice of instruments. To test
the strength of our instruments, we use F-tests of joint signi￿cance of the excluded instruments
in the ￿rst stage regressions of F, F(y ￿ y1), f, and f(y ￿ y1). Further to tests the validity of
the overidentifying restrictions, which imply that the instruments do not a⁄ect growth through
any channel other than ￿nancial innovation, we perform the Sargan J-test of overidentifying
32restrictions, whose null hypothesis is that the instruments are uncorrelated with the residuals
in the instrumental variable regressions. If our instruments were a⁄ecting growth though an
omitted variable, then the Sargan test would reject the null hypothesis.
Column (3) of Table 2 presents instrumental variable regression results. The instruments
for the ￿nancial development terms, F and F(y ￿ y1), are the same as in AHM, and we add
corresponding instruments for the ￿nancial innovation terms, f and f(y ￿ y1). Speci￿cally,
as instruments for ￿nancial development and ￿nancial innovation we use legal origin dummy
variables of the country and the change over the period 1973-1995 in the Abiad and Mody
(2005) ￿nancial reform index. Furthermore, for the interactive terms, F(y ￿y1) and f(y ￿y1),
we use as instruments the interactions of the initial real per capital GDP gap with the United
States (y￿y1) and both the legal origin dummy variables and the change in the ￿nancial reform
index. The presumption here is that countries with ￿nancial systems that remain ￿nancially
repressed do not innovate and improve their screening technologies and other ￿nancial practices.
The IV results are fully consistent with those from the OLS speci￿cation, and both the
statistical and economic signi￿cance of the e⁄ect of f(y ￿ y1) on growth di⁄erentials increases
in size. The ￿rst-stage regressions are very strong, rejecting the null hypothesis that the
instruments do not explain variation in the endogenous variables at the one percent level,
and the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions supports the choice of our instruments.
Importantly, adding our measure of ￿nancial innovation to the AHM speci￿cation reduces the
economic and statistical signi￿cance of ￿nancial development in explaining the rate at which
economies converge to the technological leader.
While the choice of ￿nancial deregulation as an instrument for innovation is supported
by the F-test of excluded instruments and the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions, some
concern remains about the validity of this instrument. The change in the ￿nancial reform index
is not a predetermined variable. Unlike the legal origin variables, it captures deregulation over
the sample period. Moreover, improvements in technology could also have triggered demand
for ￿nancial reform.
To address these concerns, in column (4), we drop ￿nancial development and use the legal
origin dummy variables as instruments for ￿nancial innovation, while also including as instru-
ments the interactions between the legal origin dummy variables and the initial real per capital
GDP gap with the United States. Using legal origin as an instrument for ￿nancial innovation
(instead of ￿nancial development) is motivated by the work by Levine (2005b), Gennaioli and
Shleifer (2007), and Djankov et al. (2007), who argue that the common law legal system pro-
33motes ￿nancial innovation. Again, the ￿rst-stage regressions reject the null hypothesis that the
instruments do not explain f and f(y ￿y1), and the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions
supports the use of our instruments.
As a further test of our theory, we test whether￿ and con￿rm that￿ the e⁄ects of f and
f(y ￿ y1) on per capita GDP growth operate through productivity growth, as implied by the
theory, rather than by only a⁄ecting physical capital accumulation. To this end, we re-estimate
equation (35) using the di⁄erence in productivity growth relative to that in the U.S. as the
dependent variable instead of per capita GDP growth di⁄erentials. And, we replace log per
capita in 1960, y, with the log of aggregate productivity in 1960, py. We obtain data on
productivity in 1960 and productivity growth over the period 1960-1995 from Benhabib and
Spiegel (2005). Productivity growth is measured by the Solow residual. The results presented
in Table 3 are similar to those obtained using the per capita GDP growth variable. Speci￿cally,
the interaction between f and (y ￿y1) still enters negatively and signi￿cantly in all equations,
with magnitudes similar to those obtained in Table 2. As before, the tests for validity and
strength of the instruments continue to support our choice of instruments.
Thus far, the results are consistent with the view that ￿nancial innovation shapes the rate
of growth convergence, but other factors could a⁄ect convergence. Perhaps, it is not ￿nancial
innovation per se; perhaps, countries fail to converge in growth rates because of lack of education
(or because ￿nancial innovation matters for growth only because it facilitates investment in
education, as in Galor and Zeira, 1993). Or, perhaps other factors a⁄ect convergence, which
are not already captured by the initial level of GDP or ￿nancial innovation. We address these
questions by considering whether the e⁄ect of ￿nancial innovation on growth convergence is
robust to considering alternative convergence channels by including interaction terms between
(y ￿ y1) and the host of country characteristics included in X. The results, estimated using
instrumental variables, are presented in Table 4.
We ￿nd that our main results are robust to controlling for a wide range of other potential
convergence channels, as captured by the term X(y ￿ y1). In all cases, the estimated sign of
the coe¢ cient on f(y ￿ y1) remains negative and statistically signi￿cant, and other than the
interaction with the black market premium variable and the ethnic diversity variable, none of
the other channels considered obtains a statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cient. Our instruments
continue to be supported by the F-test of excluded instruments and the Sargan J-test of
overidentifying restrictions.
The results also hold when using these alternative measures of ￿nancial development,
34as reported in Table 5. The ￿rst alternative measure is the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP,
where liquid liabilities equals currency plus demand and interest bearing liabilities of banks and
non-bank ￿nancial intermediaries. The second alternative measure is the ratio of bank assets to
GDP, where bank assets exclude credit from nonbank ￿nancial intermediaries. Creditor rights
is an index of the protection of creditor rights, ￿rst developed and collected by La Porta et al.
(1998) and updated by Djankov et al. (2007). Our main results on ￿nancial innovation (b5 = 0
and b6 < 0) are robust to using alternative measures of ￿nancial development.
Finally, Table 6 considers alternative measures of ￿nancial innovation. For comparison
purposes, the regression in column (1) of Table 6 replicates our earlier results in column (3)
of Table 2. In column (2) of Table 6, we use the fraction of years during the period 1960-
95 a public credit registry was in place as alternative measure of ￿nancial innovation. As
explained earlier, our prior is that this not a good measure of private sector induced ￿nancial
innovation, as public credit registries are established and owned by governments (not the private
sector). Moreover, public credit registries generally o⁄er a narrower range of services to lenders
compared to private credit bureaus. They merely o⁄er information without additional services
such as credit scoring techniques that allow lenders to reap the full bene￿ts of such information
in terms of improving their screening technology.
Consistent with our priors, we ￿nd that the establishment of public registries does not
have a signi￿cant growth convergence e⁄ect but private credit bureaus are associated with faster
convergence rates. The coe¢ cient on the interaction between the public registry variable and
(y￿y1) enters with a positive coe¢ cient that is statistically not di⁄erent from zero (column 2).
But, as already discussed, the coe¢ cient on the interaction between the private credit bureau
and initial income di⁄erences enters with a signi￿cant negative coe¢ cient (column 1).
The last column of Table 6 uses the growth rate in the ratio of private credit to GDP
over the period 1960-95 as proxy for ￿nancial innovation. As emphasized above, this alternative
measure has several shortcomings. Nevertheless, we continue to ￿nd a positive e⁄ect of ￿nancial
innovation on growth convergence when measuring ￿nancial innovation using the increase in
￿nancial development over the sample period. The interaction term between f and (y ￿ y1),
with f measured as the growth in the ratio of private credit to GDP over the period 1960 to
1995, enters with a negative coe¢ cient of -0.31 that is statistically signi￿cant at 1%, consistent
with our main results that use the screening-based measure of ￿nancial innovation.
Overall, the regression results con￿rm the theory￿ s prediction: economies without ￿nan-
cial innovation stagnate, irrespective of the initial level of ￿nancial development. Put di⁄erently,
35a faster rate of ￿nancial innovation accelerates the rate at which an economy converges to the
growth rate of the technological leader.
6 Concluding Remarks
Historically, ￿nancial innovation has been a ubiquitous characteristic of expanding economies.
Whether it is the development of new ￿nancial instruments, the creation of new corporate
structures, the formation of new ￿nancial institutions, or the development of new accounting
and ￿nancial reporting techniques, successful technological innovations have typically required
the invention of new ￿nancial arrangements. In this paper, we model the joint, endogenous
evolution of ￿nancial and technological innovation.
We model technological and ￿nancial innovation as re￿ ecting the pro￿t maximizing deci-
sions of individuals and explore the implications for economic growth. We start with a Schum-
peterian endogenous growth model where entrepreneurs can earn monopoly pro￿ts by inventing
better goods. Financiers arise to screen potential entrepreneurs. Moreover, ￿nanciers engage in
the costly and risky process of inventing better processes for screening entrepreneurs. Successful
￿nancial innovators are more e⁄ective at screening entrepreneurs than other ￿nanciers, which
generate monopoly rents and the economic motivation for ￿nancial innovation. Every partic-
ular screening process becomes obsolete as technology advances. Consequently, technological
innovation and economic growth will eventually stop unless ￿nanciers innovate.
The predictions emerging from our model, in which ￿nancial and technological entre-
preneurs interact to shape economic growth, ￿t historical experiences and cross-country data
better than existing models of ￿nancial development and growth. Rather than stressing the
level of ￿nancial development, we highlight the vital role of ￿nancial innovation in the process of
economic growth. Institutions, laws, regulations, and policies that impede ￿nancial innovation
slow technological change and economic growth.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 
This table presents summary statistics of our main regression variables. g - g1 is the growth rate of real per 
capita GDP of the country minus the U.S. growth rate in real per capita GDP, both are computed over the period 
1960-95. F is financial development, measured as private credit to GDP in 1960. y-y1 is log of per capita 
income relative to U.S. per capita income. f is screening innovation, measured as the fraction of years a private 
bureau, from Djankov, (2007), existed within the period 1960-95. School is average years of schooling in the 
population over 25 in 1960. Gov is government size, measured as government expenditure as a share of GDP, 
averaged over 1960-1995. pi is inflation rate, measured as the log difference of consumer price index average 
from 1960-1995. Bpm is the black market premium, computed as the ratio of the black market exchange rate 
and the official exchange rate minus one. Trade is openness to trade, measured as the sum of real exports and 
imports as a share of real GDP, averaged over 1960-1995. Revc is number of revolutions and coups, averaged 
over 1960-1990. A revolution is defined as any illegal or forced change in the top of the governmental elite, any 
attempt at such a change, or any successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion whose aim is independence from 
central government. Coup d’Etat is defined as an extra-constitutional or forced change in the top of the 
governmental elite and/or its effective control of the nation’s power structure in a given year. Unsuccessful 
coups are not counted. Assass is number of political assassinations per 1000 inhabitants, averaged over 1960-
1990. Avelf is ethnic diversity, measured as the average value of five indices of ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization, with values ranging from 0 to 1, where higher values denote higher levels of fractionalization. 
 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
g-g1  56  0.2841  1.6975  -4.5242  4.9406 
F  56  24.3997  20.9498  1.6661  115.3919 
y-y1  56  -1.3717  0.8017  -3.0074  0.0000 
F*(y-y1)  56  -23.2496  16.7918  -75.6332  0.0000 
f  51  0.3843  0.3925  0.0000  1.0000 
f*(y-y1)  51  -0.3773  0.5295  -2.0051  0.0000 
school  56  4.3146  2.4868  0.5400  10.0700 
gov  56  14.5572  5.0223  6.6813  30.6264 
pi  56  16.5671  19.1244  3.6289  90.7832 
bmp  56  26.5132  52.8158  0.0000  277.4202 
trade  56  59.6028  38.4645  14.0502  231.6857 
revc  56  0.1590  0.2332  0.0000  0.9704 
assass  56  0.3107  0.5206  0.0000  2.4667 
avelf  56  0.2539  0.2448  0.0025  0.8723 




Table 2. Financial Development, Financial Innovation, and Growth 
 
This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental variable (IV) estimates of a regression model 
that extends the AHM model of financial development and growth to include screening innovation. The 
dependent variable is the growth rate of real per capita GDP of the country minus the US growth rate in real per 
capita GDP, g - g1. Both are computed over the period 1960-95. F is financial development, measured as 
private credit to GDP in 1960, and f is screening innovation, measured as the fraction of years a private bureau, 
from Djankov, (2007), existed within the period 1960-95. We include the same control variables as AHM. The 
regression in Column (1) is estimated using OLS and replicates the AHM results, limiting the sample to those 
countries with data on private credit to GDP in 1960. The regression in Column (2) is estimated using OLS and 
adds screening innovation. The instrumental variables in regression (3) are legal origin and the change in the 
Abiad and Mody (2005) financial reform index over the period 1973-1995. We are missing data on financial 
reform index for 9 countries. The instrumental variable in regression (4) is the legal origin of the country. ***, 
**, and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
VARIABLES  g-g1  g-g1  g-g1  g-g1 
         
(y-y1)  -0.472  0.100  0.351  -0.0893 
  (0.529)  (0.711)  (0.557)  (0.502) 
F  -0.00498  0.00221  -0.0187   
  (0.00737)  (0.00812)  (0.0119)   
F*(y-y1)  -0.0299**  -0.0268*  -0.0336   
  (0.0134)  (0.0135)  (0.0248)   
f    -0.900  1.074  0.317 
    (0.829)  (1.320)  (0.942) 
f*(y-y1)    -1.698*  -1.880***  -2.485*** 
    (0.945)  (0.670)  (0.546) 
School  0.200*  0.0960  -0.0897  -0.0435 
  (0.112)  (0.142)  (0.141)  (0.131) 
Gov  0.0132  0.0337  0.0471  0.0370 
  (0.0410)  (0.0362)  (0.0298)  (0.0364) 
Pi  -0.000608  -0.0139  -0.0338***  -0.0293*** 
  (0.0142)  (0.0139)  (0.0109)  (0.0104) 
Bpm  -0.0170***  -0.0105**  -0.0100***  -0.00945*** 
  (0.00540)  (0.00485)  (0.00299)  (0.00300) 
Trade  0.0149**  0.00518  -0.00719  -0.00327 
  (0.00580)  (0.00889)  (0.00804)  (0.00848) 
Revc  -1.435  -0.525  0.286  -0.285 
  (0.959)  (1.007)  (0.844)  (0.907) 
Assass  -0.00700  -0.137  -0.650*  -0.338 
  (0.285)  (0.374)  (0.370)  (0.359) 
Avelf  -0.0644  0.582  1.530  1.298* 
  (0.986)  (1.050)  (1.000)  (0.769) 
Constant  -2.172*  -1.368  0.120  -0.486 
  (1.183)  (1.798)  (1.392)  (1.254) 
         
1st-stage F-test: F (p-value)  --  --  0.10  -- 
1
st-stage F-test: F*(y-y1) (p-value)  --  --  0.09  -- 
1st-stage F-test: f  --  --  0.06  0.03 
1
st-stage F-test: f*(y-y1)  --  --  0.00  0.01 
Sargan J-test (p-value)  --  --  0.95  0.23 
Observations  56  51  47  51 
R-squared  0.558  0.585  0.409  0.242 




Table 3. Financial Development, Financial Innovation, and Productivity Growth 
 
This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental variable (IV) estimates of a regression model 
that extends the AHM model of financial development and growth to include screening innovation. The 
dependent variable is average growth rate of multifactor productivity of the country relative to the US, pg - pg1, 
computed over the period 1960-95. Productivity data are from Benhabib and Spiegel (2005). py - py1 is the log 
of productivity in 1960 relative to the United States. F is financial development, measured as private credit to 
GDP in 1960, and f is screening innovation, measured as the fraction of years a private bureau, from Djankov, 
(2007), existed within the period 1960-95. We include the same control variables as AHM. The regression in 
Column (1) is estimated using OLS and limits the sample to those countries with data on private credit to GDP 
in 1960. The instrumental variables in regression (2) are legal origin and the change in the Abiad and Mody 
(2005) financial reform index over the period 1973-1995. We are missing data on financial reform index for 9 
countries. The instrumental variable in regression (3) is the legal origin of the country. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
VARIABLES  pg - pg1  pg - pg1  pg - pg1 
       
py - py1  -0.629  0.174  -0.421 
  (0.558)  (0.502)  (0.394) 
F  0.00604  -0.0112   
  (0.00634)  (0.00793)   
F*(py - py1)  -0.0172  -0.0464**   
  (0.0140)  (0.0227)   
f  -0.608  0.498  -0.120 
  (0.567)  (1.363)  (0.765) 
f*(py - py1)  -1.900*  -2.140*  -2.540*** 
  (1.020)  (1.170)  (0.537) 
School  0.0971  0.0144  0.0127 
  (0.0750)  (0.0888)  (0.0575) 
Gov  0.0166  0.0182  0.0196 
  (0.0197)  (0.0184)  (0.0180) 
Pi  -0.00501  -0.0194***  -0.0169*** 
  (0.00545)  (0.00650)  (0.00605) 
Bmp  -0.00120  -0.000129  -0.000936 
  (0.00224)  (0.00172)  (0.00174) 
Trade  0.00143  -0.00260  -0.00282 
  (0.00549)  (0.00499)  (0.00464) 
Revc  -0.794*  -0.0855  -0.419 
  (0.466)  (0.537)  (0.479) 
Assass  0.194  -0.104  0.0421 
  (0.167)  (0.219)  (0.184) 
Avelf  0.164  0.862*  0.380 
  (0.576)  (0.504)  (0.447) 
Constant  -1.760**  -0.939  -0.797 
  (0.731)  (0.739)  (0.650) 
       
1st-stage F-test: F (p-value)  --  0.00  -- 
1
st-stage F-test: F*(y - y1) (p-value)  --  0.04  -- 
1st-stage F-test: f  --  0.34  0.16 
1
st-stage F-test: f*(y - y1)  --  0.00  0.00 
Sargan J-test (p-value)  --  0.54  0.34 
Observations  48  46  48 





Table 4. Financial Development, Financial Innovation, and Growth: Other Interactions 
 
This table presents instrumental variable (IV) estimates of a regression model that extends the AHM model of 
financial development and growth to include screening innovation. The dependent variable is the growth rate of 
real per capita GDP of the country minus the US growth rate in real per capita GDP, g - g1. Both are computed 
over the period 1960-95. F is financial development, measured as private credit to GDP in 1960, and f is 
screening innovation, measured as the fraction of years a private bureau, from Djankov, (2007), existed within 
the period 1960-95. We include the same control variables as AHM but also include interactions between these 
control variables, and y – y1, the log of per capita GDP in 1960 relative to the United States.  The interacted 
control variables, X, are denoted in each column header. The instrumental variables for F and S are legal origin 
dummy variables and the change in the Abiad and Mody (2005) financial reform index over the period 1973-
1995. We are missing data on financial reform index for 9 countries. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 
percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
VARIABLES  X=school  X=gov  X=pi  X=bmp  X=trade  X=revc  X=assass  X=avelf 
                 
y-y1  0.117  -0.356  0.351  0.542  0.457  0.309  -0.0115  -0.214 
  (0.587)  (0.864)  (0.617)  (0.571)  (0.614)  (0.576)  (0.575)  (0.588) 
F  -0.0175  -0.0293  -0.0192  -0.0167  -0.0174  -0.0172  -0.0105  -0.0110 
  (0.0123)  (0.0220)  (0.0147)  (0.0111)  (0.0117)  (0.0144)  (0.0105)  (0.00833) 
F*(y-y1)  -0.0511  -0.0356  -0.0321  -0.0286  -0.0347  -0.0324  -0.0309  -0.0237 
  (0.0328)  (0.0317)  (0.0246)  (0.0207)  (0.0244)  (0.0216)  (0.0216)  (0.0189) 
f  0.684  1.852  1.071  0.831  1.062  0.922  0.665  0.00744 
  (1.225)  (2.070)  (1.514)  (1.317)  (1.293)  (1.508)  (1.142)  (0.828) 
f*(y-y1)  -2.544***  -1.850**  -1.823**  -2.081***  -1.853***  -1.928***  -1.953***  -1.979*** 
  (0.821)  (0.790)  (0.771)  (0.629)  (0.675)  (0.729)  (0.578)  (0.674) 
School  0.0616  -0.235  -0.0850  -0.159  -0.0791  -0.0807  -0.0343  -0.0654 
  (0.181)  (0.201)  (0.139)  (0.145)  (0.139)  (0.147)  (0.117)  (0.0971) 
Gov  0.0319  0.127*  0.0449  0.0447  0.0460  0.0455  0.0398  0.0610** 
  (0.0328)  (0.0720)  (0.0292)  (0.0304)  (0.0300)  (0.0300)  (0.0270)  (0.0283) 
Pi  -0.0275**  -0.0372***  -0.0392  -0.0213*  -0.0325***  -0.0337***  -0.0343***  -0.0305*** 
  (0.0121)  (0.0133)  (0.0304)  (0.0127)  (0.0114)  (0.0107)  (0.00953)  (0.00877) 
Bmp  -0.0128***  -0.0126***  -0.0105***  -0.0719**  -0.0104***  -0.0101***  -0.0103***  -0.00913*** 
  (0.00375)  (0.00339)  (0.00291)  (0.0339)  (0.00311)  (0.00287)  (0.00278)  (0.00300) 
Trade  -0.00137  -0.00757  -0.00691  -0.00420  -0.0100  -0.00688  -0.00551  -0.00746 
  (0.00891)  (0.00908)  (0.00783)  (0.00794)  (0.0111)  (0.00783)  (0.00745)  (0.00581) 
Revc  1.021  0.485  0.189  0.661  0.249  0.495  0.270  -0.190 
  (1.174)  (1.006)  (0.841)  (0.936)  (0.822)  (2.541)  (0.773)  (0.715) 
Assass  -0.835**  -0.865*  -0.622  -0.600  -0.641*  -0.672*  0.349  -0.596* 
  (0.420)  (0.495)  (0.427)  (0.367)  (0.363)  (0.398)  (0.822)  (0.309) 
Avelf  1.901  2.031  1.463  0.975  1.564  1.539  1.365  3.593** 
  (1.215)  (1.349)  (0.955)  (0.898)  (1.003)  (0.936)  (0.916)  (1.725) 
X*(y-y1)  0.204  0.0761  -0.00458  -0.0257*  -0.00286  0.125  0.649  1.473* 
  (0.187)  (0.0665)  (0.0197)  (0.0139)  (0.00722)  (1.329)  (0.473)  (0.827) 
Constant  -0.870  -0.0475  0.204  0.705  0.107  0.0707  -0.547  -0.385 
  (1.650)  (1.785)  (1.365)  (1.231)  (1.311)  (1.364)  (1.146)  (1.389) 
                 
Sargan J-test 
(p-value) 
0.95  0.87  0.93  0.88  0.96  0.95  0.90  0.13 
Observations  47  47  47  47  47  47  47  47 
R-squared  0.330  0.216  0.421  0.456  0.422  0.429  0.492  0.573 




Table 5. Financial Development, Financial Innovation, and Growth: Other Proxies for 
Financial Development 
 
This table presents instrumental variable (IV) estimates of a regression model that extends the AHM model of 
financial development and growth to include screening innovation. The dependent variable is the growth rate of 
real per capita GDP of the country minus the US growth rate in real per capita GDP, g - g1. Both are computed 
over the period 1960-95. We limit the sample to those countries with data on private credit to GDP in 1960. In 
regression (1), F is measured as the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP in 1960. In regression (2), F is measured as 
the ratio of bank assets to GDP in 1960. In regression (3), F is measured as the index of creditor rights from 
LLSV (1998). In regression (4), F is measured as the index of accounting quality in 1983 from LLSV (1998). f 
is screening innovation, measured as the fraction of years a private bureau, from Djankov, (2007), existed 
within the period 1960-95. We include the same control variables as AHM. The instrumental variables for F and 
S are legal origin dummy variables and the change in the Abiad and Mody (2005) financial reform index over 
the period 1973-1995. We are missing data on financial reform index for 9 countries. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
VARIABLES  F=liquid liabilities  F=bank assets  F=creditor  F=accounting 
         
y-y1  1.123  0.549  -0.347  3.284 
  (0.801)  (0.596)  (0.477)  (3.258) 
F  -0.0109  -0.0160  -0.286  -0.0679 
  (0.0159)  (0.0127)  (0.554)  (0.0479) 
F*(y-y1)  -0.0386**  -0.0406  -0.298  -0.0738 
  (0.0193)  (0.0276)  (0.286)  (0.0530) 
f  -0.245  0.527  -0.588  0.110 
  (1.412)  (1.518)  (0.716)  (0.898) 
f*(y-y1)  -2.900***  -2.156***  -2.508***  -1.266* 
  (0.998)  (0.747)  (0.537)  (0.656) 
school  -0.0528  -0.0733  -0.0738  0.0694 
  (0.114)  (0.137)  (0.0911)  (0.105) 
gov  0.0277  0.0411  0.0242  0.0571* 
  (0.0322)  (0.0279)  (0.0355)  (0.0306) 
pi  -0.0296***  -0.0301**  -0.0299**  -0.00498 
  (0.00897)  (0.0131)  (0.0118)  (0.0158) 
bmp  -0.00892***  -0.0114***  -0.0268*  -0.0558* 
  (0.00302)  (0.00296)  (0.0147)  (0.0286) 
trade  -0.00384  -0.00689  -0.00369  -0.00688 
  (0.00708)  (0.00712)  (0.00726)  (0.00793) 
revc  1.136  0.535  1.911**  0.0342 
  (1.223)  (0.850)  (0.961)  (1.620) 
assass  -0.605  -0.708*  -0.699  -0.364 
  (0.400)  (0.395)  (0.457)  (0.435) 
avelf  0.864  1.637*  -0.724  -0.369 
  (0.744)  (0.993)  (0.889)  (1.659) 
Constant  0.409  0.126  0.678  3.047 
  (1.104)  (1.261)  (1.331)  (3.273) 
         
Sargan J-test (p-value)  0.94  0.96  0.36  0.78 
Observations  45  47  38  33 
R-squared  0.425  0.438  0.682  0.620 
 




Table 6. Financial Development, Financial Innovation, and Growth: Other Proxies for 
Financial Innovation 
 
This table presents instrumental variable (IV) estimates of a regression model that extends the AHM model of 
financial development and growth to include screening innovation. The dependent variable is the growth rate of 
real per capita GDP of the country minus the US growth rate in real per capita GDP, g - g1. Both are computed 
over the period 1960-95. F is the ratio of private credit to GDP in 1960. We limit the sample to those countries 
with data on private credit to GDP in 1960. f denotes screening innovation. In regression (1), f is measured as 
the fraction of years a private credit bureau existed within the period 1960-95. In regression (2), f is measured 
as the fraction of years a public credit registry existed within the period 1960-95. In regression (3), f is 
measured as the growth in the ratio of private credit to GDP over the period 1960-95. We include the same 
control variables as AHM. The instrumental variables for F and S are legal origin dummy variables and the 
change in the Abiad and Mody (2005) financial reform index over the period 1973-1995. We are missing data 
on financial reform index for 9 countries. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 
percent level, respectively. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 







private credit to 
GDP 
       
y-y1  0.351  -0.235  0.233 
  (0.557)  (0.707)  (0.598) 
F  -0.0187  -0.00823  0.00259 
  (0.0119)  (0.0112)  (0.00849) 
F*(y-y1)  -0.0336  -0.0462  -0.0165 
  (0.0248)  (0.0287)  (0.0202) 
f  1.074  2.581  0.0365 
  (1.320)  (1.925)  (0.167) 
f*(y-y1)  -1.880***  4.284  -0.310*** 
  (0.670)  (3.033)  (0.105) 
school  -0.0897  0.0945  -0.00734 
  (0.141)  (0.138)  (0.114) 
gov  0.0471  0.0168  0.00994 
  (0.0298)  (0.0373)  (0.0310) 
pi  -0.0338***  0.0146  -0.000276 
  (0.0109)  (0.0111)  (0.00897) 
bmp  -0.0100***  -0.0154***  0.00365 
  (0.00299)  (0.00474)  (0.00439) 
trade  -0.00719  0.00782  -0.00607 
  (0.00804)  (0.00855)  (0.00691) 
revc  0.286  -1.499*  -3.487** 
  (0.844)  (0.902)  (1.570) 
assass  -0.650*  -0.254  0.287 
  (0.370)  (0.415)  (0.521) 
avelf  1.530  0.656  -2.378** 
  (1.000)  (1.778)  (0.951) 
Constant  0.120  -1.474  0.291 
  (1.392)  (1.601)  (1.650) 
       
Sargan J-test (p-value)  0.95  0.38  0.26 
Observations  47  47  47 
R-squared  0.409  0.175  0.371 
 